Neo-structural economic sociology beyond

embeddedness: relational infrastructures and social

processes in markets and market institutions by Brailly, Julien et al.
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse 
researchers and makes it freely available over the web where possible 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent  
to the repository administrator: tech-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
This is a publisher’s version published in: https://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/26003 
To cite this version: 
Brailly, Julien and Comet, Catherine and Delarre, Sébastien [et al.] 
Neo-structural economic sociology beyond embeddedness: 
relational infrastructures and social processes in markets and 
market institutions. (2018) Economic sociology, 19 (3). 36-49. ISSN 
1871-3351 
Open  Archive  Toulouse  Archive  Ouverte 
Official URL :  
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/181300 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Volume 19 · Number 3 · July 2018
36
Neo-structural 
economic 
sociology 
beyond 
embeddedness
Relational infrastructures and 
social processes in markets and 
market institutions
ORIO Network
Julien Brailly, ENSAT, Toulouse 
Catherine Comet, Université de Lille, CLERSE
Sébastien Delarre, Université de Lille, CLERSE
Fabien Eloire, Université de Lille, CLERSE
Guillaume Favre, Université de Toulouse, LISST
Emmanuel Lazega, Sciences Po, CSO, IUF
Lise Mounier, Ecole Normale Supérieure, CMH
Jaime Montes-Lihn, Université Paris-Dauphine, IRISSO
Mohamed Oubenal, IRCAM, Rabat
Elise Penalva-Icher, Université Paris-Dauphine, IRISSO
Alvaro Pina-Stranger, Université de Rennes, CREM
Introduction
In the context of the sophisticated division of labor in contemporary economies, a majority of individ-uals, organizations, and institutions participating 
in economic production, exchange, and consumption 
are thrust into open forms of competition imposed by 
contemporary capitalisms; in other words, neoliberal 
public authorities and global companies shaping the 
contexts and lives of smaller, less powerful actors. To 
dominate and/or survive, all have strong incentivesto 
play complex games of cooperation among competi-
tors. Along with capital, labor, and natural resources, 
cooperation among competitors is seen here as a 
“fourth factor of production.” The research program 
focusing on this phenomenon combines White’s 
(1981, 2001) perspective on production markets ex-
tended to the “Economie des Conventions” (Favereau, 
1994, 2002) with a theory of collegiality as collective 
action among rival peers (Lazega, 2001), thus bringing 
together structure, culture, and agency (individual 
and collective) in a new way.1 In order to accomplish 
this, we define markets as both bureaucratic and colle-
gial (Lazega and Mounier, 2002), and socio-economic 
relationships both as channels for heterogeneous re-
sources and as symbolic commitments that have to 
build their credibility. These commitments are equiva-
lent to a promise, an obligation, or a convention intro-
ducing time into the exchange of resources. They rely 
on social control and conflict resolution to make such 
commitments credible.
Our work on cooperation among competitors 
assumes that we live in a stratified and multi-level or-
ganizational society (Perrow, 1991). With some excep-
tions, it looks mainly at intra-class cooperation among 
competitors. Class differences between small entre-
preneurs and high-level executives in these systems 
matter enormously and are often more conducive to 
brute force exploitation and violence across levels than 
to cooperation. The kind of cooperation among com-
petitors on which we work is usually within-class, be-
tween actors who tend to share the same position at 
the meso level of society, for example in the economic 
market in which they are players or in institutions of 
joint regulation of markets in which they acquire re-
sponsibilities. This, as we shall also see, does not pre-
clude cross-level between-class interactions and activ-
ities that can be cooperative – but addressing system-
atically all the complexities of meso–macro relation-
ships in society remains a future prospect of economic 
sociology in general, including ours.
This short presentation is a “go to” summary 
providing interested readers with indications of our 
development of this neo-structural economic sociol-
ogy. The notion of a social discipline that is perceived 
as legitimate by members of a social milieu is an im-
portant notion for understanding the contemporary 
form of cooperation between competitors. This form 
of cooperation relies on two dimensions of the very 
general notion of social discipline. A first dimension is 
located at the individual level and can be observed in 
the relational and symbolic work previously discussed. 
Actors are equipped with a social rationality (Lazega, 
1992), thanks to which they design common projects 
and invest in relationships to manage their interde-
“Whoever imagines that masters rarely 
combine is as ignorant of the world as of 
the subject. Masters are always and every 
where in a sort of tacit, but constant and 
uniform combination.”
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
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pendencies via multiplex social exchange. The second 
dimension of the notion of social discipline exists at 
the collective level, although it is also endogenized by 
individual members. We refer to this second dimen-
sion as relational infrastructures.2 These infrastruc-
tures include horizontal and vertical differentiations 
in the social milieux of interdependent entrepreneurs. 
Horizontal differentiations correspond to systems of 
niches and vertical differentiations to heterogeneous 
forms of status. Relational infrastructures are crucial 
for the deployment and steering of key social processes 
usually associated with collective action among inter-
dependent peers. We focus on such processes because 
they can help actors in man-
aging the dilemmas of their 
collective actions: collective 
learning and socialization, 
bounded solidarity and ex-
clusions, social control and 
conflict resolution, regula-
tion and institutionalization. 
Our methodological contribution offers models of 
such processes using socio-economic network analy-
ses mixed with other methods.
An entrepreneur’s social niche can be defined as 
the subgroup of other entrepreneurs with whom he or 
she has particularly dense, multi-functional, and du-
rable relationships linked, directly or indirectly, with 
his or her production activities. It then constitutes a 
pool of privileged partners in the exchange of these 
resources, at the inter-organizational level. A niche 
makes sense only in a system of niches identifying a 
division of work based on the concept of structural 
equivalence (White et al. 1976) and social homophily. 
It can be detected in a social milieu by its strong rela-
tional cohesion and by the presence of some form of 
generalized exchange measured as relational cycles of 
direct and indirect reciprocity. The precise contours of 
a social niche as an empirical entity capable of orga-
nized collective agency are sometimes difficult to 
grasp, for its members as well as for the observer.
In addition to niche-seeking, the quest for sta-
tus – that is, the “importance” of the individual in the 
collective – creates another relational infrastructure 
on which collective action among rival peers relies. 
The multiple exogenous dimensions of social status 
classically defined by Max Weber can be measured as 
concentrations of different kinds of resources (eco-
nomic, political, and social). With more endogenous 
measures such as those offered by network analysis 
(essentially measures of centrality and prominence), 
additional and heterogeneous dimensions of status are 
brought into the picture. Exogenous and endogenous 
status competition gives access to a mandate to rep-
resent the collective, to gain authority, to control re-
sources, and to the capacity of defining terms of social 
exchanges. This approach to status both relies on and 
reaches beyond Podolny’s (2011) definition of status as 
indicative of quality and as criterion for the selection 
of exchange partners in situations of market uncer-
tainty. 
Also beyond Granovetter’s (1985) embedded-
ness studies and critique of theories for which eco-
nomic transactions are under-socialized or over-so-
cialized, our neo-structural economic sociology fo-
cuses on modeling this social discipline, relational in-
frastructures, and social processes in collective action 
among entrepreneurs. From this perspective, coopera-
tion among competitors – for example, in partnerships 
or joint ventures between companies and their sub-
contractors, in joint R&D programs, in industrial dis-
tricts, and so on – is an oligopolistic game. Oligopolies 
emerge notably to protect entrepreneurs from merci-
less monopolistic competition, helping them impose 
jointly dictated or “suggested” prices and rules. Entre-
preneurs may overtly or secretly look for opportuni-
ties to eliminate competitors. But as Adam Smith’s 
words above indicate, in waiting for such opportuni-
ties, an intermediary objective is to collectively repro-
duce the market by maintaining common relational 
infrastructures and agreements for coordination and 
collective action. Markets with oligopolistic structures 
are therefore the rule more than the exception. Our 
methodological choice has been, over the years, to 
study “collegial oligarchies” or “collegial pockets” in 
market areas, thus examining articulations between 
strategies of elites and strategies of small and medium-
size actors often struggling for survival. 
Finally, managing cut-throat competition with 
durable cooperation based on relational infrastruc-
tures and social processes among competitors does 
not depend exclusively on shared varieties of such so-
cial disciplines. It also depends on the knowledge and 
recognition of that discipline by public authorities in-
volved in social control and regulation of markets. 
New questions arise from shifting boundaries between 
private and public spheres in society. The growing pri-
vatization of public services, for example, increases 
the influence of business and cooperation among 
competitors on public policies (often open penetra-
tion – through governance – of the State apparatus by 
business), both economic and social policies. Under 
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such conditions, one of the main tasks of neo-struc-
tural economic sociology is also to focus on (ethno-
graphically observable) specialized social settings in 
which interdependent entrepreneurs carry out politi-
cal work promoting their regulatory interests and spe-
cific designs for the organization of markets. By shed-
ding light on their social discipline, this work offers 
new insights into public/private institutions and 
ecologies of institutions regulating markets –institu-
tions often characterized by discretion and opaque-
ness. Such insights can also contribute to strengthen-
ing public interest in new and polynormative forms of 
“joint regulation” of markets (that is, by business itself 
and public authorities) that characterize Western 
forms of capitalism.
Multiplex social exchanges: 
The entrepreneur’s relational 
and symbolic work
Organizations in general, be they public administra-
tions or private enterprises, individual or multina-
tional, do not conduct their business in isolation. They 
are necessarily resource-dependent (Aldrich and Pfef-
fer 1976), which forces them to establish links of coop-
eration with other organizations. These relationships 
are expressed within a more or less defined legal and 
social framework. Levine and White (1961) already 
laid down the foundation for an analysis of inter-orga-
nizational relationships in terms of exchanges and re-
source-dependencies (Aldrich and Marsden 1988). 
These inter-organizational resources, exchanged 
through multiplex links, consist of information, goods, 
and services that are not necessarily of a purely mone-
tary or functional nature. Therefore, cooperation 
among competitors requires symbolic work and social 
exchanges establishing personalized relationships 
with competing peers, using both threats (for exam-
ple, of open economic war and cut-throat practices) 
and promises (for example, of shared benefits). 
Cooperation between competitors thus presup-
poses important relational and symbolic activities 
within social exchanges. Numerous studies of the 
complex, sometimes paradoxical relationship between 
the entrepreneur’s relational capital and the various 
forms of economic performance (survival, profits, 
growth, and so on) (Burt 1992 2005; Ingram and Rob-
erts 2000; Uzzi 1999) illustrate the importance of so-
cial exchange. For Burt (2005), a successful entrepre-
neur has a network that is dense within and sparse 
beyond the group or organization in which he belongs. 
Working beyond Burt’s approach, Comet [2007] shows 
that craftspeople in the French construction industry 
need to juggle with several business models in order to 
survive: as subcontractors for large bureaucratic build-
ing companies; as individual craftspeople for personal 
clients; as contractors/subcontractors with their fellow 
craftspeople when their building sites are too large for 
a small individual business. Given the diversity of 
business models, the situation requires multiplex rela-
tionships and cooperation skills with fellow crafts-
people. Comet’s research shows the various ways in 
which multiplexity becomes a source of economic 
performance depending on each entrepreneur’s vari-
ability of tasks and specific technical constraints in 
construction sites.
At the level of giant financial or industrial hold-
ings as well, cooperation among competitors by build-
ing, maintaining, and dissolving relational infrastruc-
tures is part of complex adaptation to markets. Delarre 
(2005) has shown that, in France, holdings of French 
enterprises (1991–1999) tend to fit that model, too. 
These groups form new social entities characterized 
by dense and multiple exchanges between the enter-
prises that they cluster. The empirical phenomenon of 
strategic alliances offers the possibility of observing 
social niches founded on multiple exchanges between 
partners. Delarre describes different types of resources 
circulating within such business groups: capital, per-
sonnel, expertise, control, and so on. In spite of the 
crystallization of such a social entity, holding groups 
of enterprises remain flexible enough to last longer 
than might be expected. They notably do so by struc-
turing group-level labor markets. By rapidly laying off 
and reshuffling members in the companies that they 
administer (15 percent turnover per year), these 
groups maintain a constant watch over the evolution 
of markets. They are thus capable of managing the 
fundamental problem of the “paradox of embedded-
ness”: being neither too “embedded” (that is, immobi-
lized in a collective, cohesive, and stable configura-
tion), nor too “disembedded.” They can find a balance 
and durability that explains their domination over the 
contemporary French economy. This does not stop 
them from encouraging their personnel to buy shares 
in group enterprises that are scheduled to be liqui-
dated very quickly.
Relational infrastructures in 
social processes 
Analytically speaking, relational and symbolic work 
creates relational infrastructures, and the latter trig-
ger or facilitate, in turn, social processes in what 
Berkowitz (1988) calls “market areas.” Reconstituting 
relational infrastructures – in particularistic forms of 
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solidarity (and the discriminations and exclusions 
that come attached), in collective learning and social-
izations, in social control and conflict resolution, and 
in regulation and institutionalization of new norms – 
provides evidence of the existence, at the collective 
level, of the social discipline among competing entre-
preneurs in which we are interested. The articulation 
between relational infrastructures and social pro-
cesses in social discipline can be illustrated with ex-
amples of empirical research on these four generic 
processes. These processes are not mechanical in the 
sense that they would exist independently of individ-
uals’ intentional efforts. But they are social mecha-
nisms on which individual actors are nevertheless 
embarked. They are triggered by relational work and 
eventually escape individuals’ control in a Mertonian 
sense. 
Collective learning
The first social process facilitating collective action be-
tween competitors is collective learning. In highly 
technological societies and economies, which value 
research and innovation exploiting this technology, 
collective learning in the exchange of tacit knowledge 
and sharing experience (Polanyi 1967) represents a 
crucial process. It has long been studied in manage-
ment (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995) and a rich literature reports research 
on the process of learning in strategic alliances. Orga-
nizations seeking quantitative and qualitative compet-
itive advantages mutually monitor one another (White, 
1981). Enterprises establish alliances because they 
hope to benefit, among other purposes, from the 
learning resources to which such links give access. 
Companies are particularly attracted by new know-
how, techniques, and competencies from alliances 
with other companies (Kogut and Zander 1996; Pow-
ell et al. 1996). But at the level of sophistication reached 
by contemporary technology, these enterprises seek to 
learn from each other while at the same time trying to 
compete on strategic aspects, such as market distribu-
tion. In this complex learning process, social interac-
tions and informal relationships that are more or less 
collusive are decisive for social exchange of tacit 
knowledge. In particular, where entrepreneurs depend 
upon one another for unbillable exchanges of opinion 
and advice, the collective nature of production and 
certification of quality often corresponds to hidden 
costs carried by the milieu (“the profession”), its insti-
tutions, and its most important actors (colleagues with 
“reputation”).
Examples of modeling collective learning among 
competing entrepreneurs based on information shar-
ing and advice relationships are provided in research 
by Pina-Stranger (2008), Oubenal (2015), and Mon-
tes-Lihn (2017).
Pina-Stranger’s (2008) studies collective learn-
ing between entrepreneurs in the French biotech 
industry. Entrepreneurs from this milieu face very 
high levels of risk: a product development timeframe 
is rarely shorter than ten years; capitalistic needs 
can be satisfi ed only by a small number of fi nancial 
 actors, notably venture capital; there are increasingly 
demanding regulatory constraints on product regis-
tration; and there are also diffi  culties related to the 
innovative and complex nature of activities linked 
to therapeutic prescriptions in life sciences. Th ese 
entrepreneurs evolve in an environment in which 
competition is permanent: they fi ght to obtain grants 
and sub sidies from the State, to be granted use of an 
incubator or to be admitted into a “pole of compe-
titiveness” (“compétitivité”) to reach private investors 
or win a contract with a pharmaceutical company. In 
this context, Pina-Stranger examines advice, friend-
ship, and business networks among the 140 biotech 
entrepreneurs specializing in human health in France. 
Analyses show that in the absence of any contractual 
relationship, scientifi c entrepreneurs in these diverse 
and small companies are involved in multiple, recip-
rocal relationships, building forms of bounded soli-
darity in specifi c social niches. In very open business 
models, based on the maintenance of a multiplicity 
of contracts with various partners (direct investors, 
investment banks, suppliers, notation agencies, pub-
lic institutions, subcontractors, and so on), they oft en 
count on locally direct competitors to validate their 
choices, thus informally integrating the latter’s judg-
ments in their decisions. One of the outcomes of this 
research is to show that inter-organizational collec-
tive learning is diff erent from the same process at the 
intra-organizational level (Pina-Stranger and Lazega, 
2010). At the intra-organizational level, epistemic 
disagreements are solved by centralization and align-
ment on high-status opinion leaders. In this context, 
members tend not to seek advice from others “below” 
them in the organizational status hierarchy. At the 
inter-organizational level, absence of a formal hier-
archy encourages entrepreneurs to invest heavily in 
relational activity. Th is behavior allows them to keep 
their status in a context in which epistemic confl icts 
become entrenched, following a polarization process, 
in diff erent epistemic communities. Th is diff erence 
has implications for the way in which a collective 
solves the problems related to the creation of a hier-
archy  between diff erent bodies of appropriate knowl-
edge.
Montes-Lihn (2017) shows how wine producers 
manage the transition to organic and biodynamic 
farming by relying on networks of informal advice 
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among competing peers. Farming based on ecological 
alternatives prohibits synthetic chemicals. This re-
striction represents a technical challenge and leads to 
the introduction of a new set of agronomic practices. 
The adoption of organic practices is seen by wine pro-
ducers as a risky decision with strong economic and 
symbolic (prestige-related) consequences in case of 
failure. In that sense, information that they may share 
to make appropriate technical decisions through ad-
vice networks is key. Montes-Lihn shows that advice 
sharing and discussion among over 60 wine-produc-
ers in the Burgundy Region in France are part of a 
larger socialization process that requires a strong rela-
tional and ideological investment, signaling a com-
mitment to shared ecological values. Adoption of 
green practices is far more than a mere technical issue. 
This study identifies two simultaneous learning pro-
cesses. The first is based on homophily among wine 
producers within the boundaries of social niches. The 
social boundaries defining the profile of the partici-
pants in this specific learning process are determined 
by common values. In the second learning process, 
knowledge is shared beyond the boundaries of social 
niches. It maintains a ratchet effect in ecological tran-
sition. This learning process is coupled with a social-
ization mechanism because experienced wine produc-
ers tend to initiate novices into the implicit social 
norms on which the professional milieu is founded. 
Ethnographic work shows that this socialization 
mechanism (learning and reminders of social norms 
that come attached) present in the second process is 
led by the experienced wine producers. Socialization 
aims to preserve the collective, sometimes exclusive 
ways in which knowledge is shared and the values that 
have guided experienced producers’ own ecological 
transition.
Oubenal (2015) looks at how information about 
new financial products is managed by market players 
promoting these products based on the idea that they 
are risk-free. This orchestration of the circulation of 
information about the products is examined in the 
network of social relationships between the players in 
this market. Promoters with specific forms of episte-
mic status in this community (in particular, university 
professors in key business schools) facilitate the diffu-
sion of a positive and reassuring discourse in academia 
and the press, even if their financial products are com-
plex and represent much riskier investments than ac-
knowledged. Specialized journalists do not have ac-
cess to actors who could provide them with relevant 
information about the riskiness of the products unless 
their articles contribute positively to the overall proj-
ect. They are subjected to a form of social control that 
strengthens the social construction of ignorance of 
risks in this financial market. 
Particularistic solidarities and discriminations
Echoing previous work in the literature, such as that of 
Ingram and Roberts (2000), a second social process 
facilitating collective action by interdependent but 
competing entrepreneurs is a form of particularistic, 
bounded solidarity. It is represented by the creation, 
often in social niches within the collective, of informal 
systems of multiplex generalized exchange, as already 
identified. Such a system helps members exchange 
several types of heterogeneous production-related re-
sources, directly or indirectly, allowing for lasting cir-
culation, while also partially suspending behavior per-
ceived as opportunistic. As already discussed, the 
analysis of “complete” networks allows the observa-
tion, in and between organizations, of the presence of 
cyclical relational substructures characterizing indi-
rect and deferred reciprocity, with their potential im-
plications for direct or indirect forms of social exclu-
sion and discrimination. The analytical connection 
between the notion of social niche and that of particu-
laristic solidarity, measured by the existence of indi-
rect reciprocity, requires that the latter be based nota-
bly on the identities, boundaries and norms defined by 
the former.
Here the articulation between the search for so-
cial niches and status competition at the inter-organi-
zational level deserves special attention. A striking 
example is provided by Eloire (2007) in his study of 
restaurant owners in the city of Lille. His analyses of 
social networks among more than 300 restaurateurs 
identify the coexistence of several Whitian markets 
varying along a culturally coded quality schedule. He 
detects a specific form of homophily in this network: 
restaurant owners seem to have a stronger propensity 
for exchanging with colleagues whose restaurants be-
long to the same type of sub-market. For example, 
owners in White’s “paradoxical” sub-market (that of 
high-end restaurants of gastronomy chefs) are more 
central and strongly homophilous and exclusive. A 
central social niche that structures this milieu and in 
which high-end restaurant owners, far more relation-
ally active than others, share interesting business in-
formation pertaining to subjects as varied as staff, sup-
pliers, food, or overhead expenses. This central niche 
maintains social distances, in the friendship network, 
with a second social niche bringing together younger, 
yet to be consecrated chefs. Unlike general discussion 
networks, networks focused on transfer or exchange 
of interesting business tips are much more confiden-
tial and selective. Indegree centralities in the latter 
network show that strategic information is very un-
equally distributed between the members of this occu-
pation. Cooperation in this milieu is indeed driven by 
both status competition (for stars in famous guides) 
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and niche homophily. Within social niches, Eloire 
clearly finds special forms of particularistic solidarity 
between these restaurateurs. The fact that these niches 
do not seem to bridge different kinds of sub-markets 
tends to reveal social class logics in this form of 
bounded solidarity: sub-markets in this milieu are 
stratified socially, economically, and culturally.
Bounded solidarity based on variable combina-
tions of social niches and status competition have also 
been identified among corporate elites in France 
(Comet & Finez, 2010; Finez & Comet, 2011) and in 
Morocco (Oubenal 2016; Oubenal & Zeroual, 2017).
Social control and conflict resolution
This example stresses that the existence of social niches 
and the recognition and acquisition of various forms 
of status also facilitate a third process, that of social 
control in the business world (but also sometimes the 
deactivation of such relation-based controls). It must 
nonetheless be noted that few neo-structural studies 
examine the importance of niches and of status com-
petition for control and rule enforcement. At the in-
ter-organizational level, social niches are far more of-
ten identified as sources of deviance or corruption, or 
considered infractions of antitrust laws. However, 
much more than at the intra-organizational level, or-
ganizations’ selective relational “investments” in each 
other raise the problem of sunk costs (when partners 
behave in an opportunistic way). Relational processes 
prove necessary for treating questions of first- and sec-
ond-order free-riding problems. This is not new be-
cause previous sociological approaches to social con-
trol in the business world insist on use by actors of ex 
ante methods based on reputation, considered by in-
stitutional economists to be a powerful governance 
mechanism (Macaulay 1963; Raub and Weesie 1993). 
Entrepreneurs who wish to maintain long-term eco-
nomic relationships with partners worry about their 
reputations. But this reputation does not belong to 
them; it is the product of evaluations and critiques 
from their partners and the milieu of other entrepre-
neurs concerning their behavior, their reliability, their 
creditworthiness, and so on (Burt 2005). 
One approach consists precisely in observing le-
gal institutions used by entrepreneurs to solve their 
conflicts. A study of social control of business by lay 
“consular” commercial courts in France shows how 
competition for social status (among other mecha-
nisms) has allowed such an institution to last for nearly 
five centuries. A longitudinal network study of 238 
judges at the Commercial Court of Paris, an institu-
tion founded in the sixteenth century, exposes pre-
cisely that kind of process. Lay judges coopted into 
this court act as individual voluntary judges, as well as 
representatives (in theory without specific mandates) 
of the local business community. Observation of this 
organization shows that half of these judges have a le-
gal background. Twenty-nine percent (between 2000 
and 2005) among them come from the banking and 
finance sector, an obvious overrepresentation which, 
in most European and Anglo-Saxon countries, would 
raise questions about impartiality and conflicts of in-
terest (or at least the appearance of conflicts) – espe-
cially in a jurisdiction handling bankruptcies, as well 
as ordinary contract-related commercial litigation. 
Analysis of the dynamics of advice networks between 
these magistrates shows that the bankers with law de-
gree have a very high “epistemic” social status in the 
court; over time they tend to become increasingly in-
fluential among their colleagues, for example in issues 
related to contract breach, assessment of damages, un-
fair competition, conflicts between boards and minor-
ity shareholders. Thus, their specific form of social sta-
tus is used at the inter-organizational level, via this 
institution, to remote-control local business commu-
nities in a framework of joint regulation of their mar-
kets. Social niches also emerge within this institution, 
as in the conflict between, for example, a cluster of 
bankers with a law degree and another cluster of 
judges coming from the building industry: the two are 
strongly opposed on matters of punitivity and inter-
ventionism in markets and in boards. This articulation 
between niches and statuses seems to facilitate the so-
cial control of markets, but at the price of domination 
of the court by the banking industry and its brand of 
pragmatism and criteria of commercial justice (Lazega 
and Mounier 2008). The question arises whether such 
mechanisms of social control of business and contrac-
tual activity actually increase unequal conflict resolu-
tion between small and large businesses, or between 
producers and consumers.
In the same spirit, Comet (2011) shows how a 
Ponzi scheme can be based on manipulation of lateral 
social control by con crews abusing solidary and trust-
ing relationships, using their victim’s social network to 
escape social controls usually at work around financial 
operations, allowing the deviant system to feed upon 
itself. In an extraordinarily rich and ongoing project 
on social control in the management of common pool 
resource institutions (CPRIs), Brailly and Faye (forth-
coming) measure longitudinal social networks be-
tween households in seven villages in a region of Sen-
egal where management of scarce water resources is 
both formally institutionalized and informally carried 
out by villagers themselves using these personal ties. 
Beyond Ostrom (1990), they use a sociological 
neo-structural approach to show that sanctions for 
members pumping more water than allowed can be 
less impersonal than expected by CPRI theory, more 
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personalized and based on relational infrastructures 
found in the community. Social control in the com-
mons is thus shown to be based on a combination of 
two mechanisms. The first mechanism allows the 
members of a community to lower the costs of exercis-
ing control by using their personal ties and low puni-
tivity for that purpose, especially for targets of social 
control that are personally close to them. The second 
mechanism consists of using an executive committee 
(“the board”) – that is, a more formal process – for 
more impersonal and more punitive sanctioning, for 
targets either very close to or socially distant from the 
respondent. Combining both mechanisms is meant to 
avoid oppositional solidarity between respondent, 
sanctioners, and targets.
To our knowledge, research only scratches the 
surface of all the ways in which relational infrastruc-
tures help interdependent entrepreneurs monitor and 
sanction each other before resorting to legal proceed-
ings. Social studies of finance also show that financial 
actors exchange information and engage in collective 
actions among competitors (Abolafia 2001; Baker and 
Faulkner, 1993; Mackenzie and Millo, 2003). While fi-
nancial markets are considered to be spaces of fierce 
competition, recent investigations related to the Libor 
and Euribor scandals have shown that they actually 
involve systematic collusion and conflicts of interest. 
Regulation and institutionalization
The neo-structural approach has been particularly 
used to explore and model the fourth, most political 
process of regulation and institutionalization of new 
norms, namely the redefinition of the rules of the 
game between interdependent but competing entre-
preneurs. Formation of norms and definition of stan-
dards stabilizing commitments and social exchanges 
in situations of uncertainty has long been an issue in 
institutional economics (for example, Commons 
1924). This regulatory process is in fact one of institu-
tional adaptation, as well as institutional change and 
redesign. Here again, competitors cooperate in order 
to establish a common language of reference and com-
mon norms. In this area, beyond neo-institutional 
culturalist and cognitivist approaches, neo-structural 
sociology often relies on conventionalist and regula-
tionist economists, for whom the role of rules and in-
stitutions, whether formal or informal, is crucial in 
explaining entrepreneurs’ cooperation and the perfor-
mance of markets in general (Boyer, 2015; Favereau 
1989, 2002; North 1991). 
Public regulation of the economy using incen-
tives is a traditional domain of political and institu-
tional economics. Neo-structural sociology, in a 
Selznickian (1949) vein, has contributed insights into 
the efficiency of such incentives (Varanda, 2005). For 
example, in the case of the city-center commerce of a 
medium-size city in Portugal a network study using 
blockmodelling shows the existence of social niches 
and different forms of status among shopkeepers, cre-
ating particularistic forms of solidarity that encourage 
or undermine participation in a policy program, 
namely attempts to modernize tourism as an industry. 
One block, composed of the board of the trade associ-
ation (“formal” leaders of city-center commerce) and 
those close to them, promotes participation and ac-
ceptance of an incentive program offered by the city, 
which does not disrupt the status quo. Another social 
niche is composed of the group of young shopkeepers 
who do not accept these incentives and build their so-
cial status by breaking with the status quo – for in-
stance, by systematically opening their shops on week-
ends. No group wants to let go of their position. Status 
competition, age, and cultural homophily impede a 
broader solidarity and lead to the failure of moderni-
zation. 
Business has always tried to participate in the 
regulation of its markets and create self-contained, au-
tonomous, often public–private normative orders 
smoothing market operations. Status competition is 
an essential element of this regulatory process, whether 
leading to real changes or to resistance to change. Spe-
cial dynamics characterize regulation: that of oligar-
chic negotiation of precarious values (Lazega 2001). 
The regulatory process for markets looks at how entre-
preneurs become institutional entrepreneurs active in 
the regulation of their markets. Even in an egalitarian 
system, it can be observed that not everyone defends 
their regulatory interests with the same efficiency. It is 
not simply that the strongest impose their rules: rather, 
network analyses show that actors with multiple, het-
erogeneous, high and inconsistent (in the sense of so-
cially uncorrelated) forms of status (Lazega 2001, 
2016; Lazega and Mounier, 2002; Lazega et al., 2016) 
are the most influential in this selection of priority 
norms. They punch above their weight in the regula-
tory process because they combine a form of legiti-
macy (an ability to speak on behalf of the collective in 
a credible manner, especially using the rhetoric of sac-
rifice of status) with power (the control of resources 
others need). This approach establishes a link between 
norms and values, on one side, and interests, power, 
and structure, on the other. High status inconsistency 
combined with the right kind of rhetoric, in particular, 
is important: able to lose status on one dimension be-
cause they keep their status along other dimensions, 
institutional entrepreneurs succeed in buying enough 
legitimacy to sell stagnation or change to their entire 
system of actors. In this as well, a form of endoge-
neization of the structure helps catalyze a very com-
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plex process. In the business world, regulation of busi-
ness is today openly characterized by a great polynor-
mativity (Lazega and Mounier, 2009). The relative 
weight of the law versus other types of norms depends 
on the strength that the state and public institutions 
summon to influence this joint regulation in concrete 
situations of economic conflict. To contribute to a the-
ory of institutionalization, it is useful to observe that 
the primacy of law with respect to other norms is not 
necessarily based on the primacy of the State. It be 
based on businesses’ ability to participate in the defini-
tion and enforcement of the law via processes of lob-
bying and joint regulation (as, for example, in Edel-
man et al.’s [2011] “endogeneization” of law).
As the above example of the Commercial Court 
of Paris shows, business intervention in the regulatory 
process has always existed. But it is becoming increas-
ingly more systematic today, as the so-called “regula-
tory” State tends to establish – in all the domains of 
public policy – general and vague legal frameworks, 
leaving the task of defining the substance of the rules 
to stakeholders contributing to governance, in our 
case, market operators. Penalva-Icher (2007) offers an 
excellent example of this type of regulatory process by 
examining the social construction, in France, of a fi-
nancial market, the so-called “socially responsible” 
market promoting “ethical” funds. Actors involved in 
building this market – mainly trying to lure pension 
funds and savings institutions – are very heteroge-
neous. Nuns rub shoulders (and elbows) with bankers, 
asset managers, extra-financial analysts, union activ-
ists, university professors, regulators, and so on. 
 Penalva-Icher examines an intermediate step in the 
construction of this market, the cooperation between 
institutional entrepreneurs seeking to impose their 
concept of “social responsibility” on everyone else. 
 Effectively, in this market, investment vehicles such as 
shares are selected based not only on the financial per-
formance of companies, but also on social, environ-
mental, and ethical considerations. Analyses of the 
relational infrastructures of the milieu promoting this 
market reveal the social discipline that is mobilized to 
preselect operators allowed to participate in the regu-
latory process. On the market of socially responsible 
investments (SRI), ethnographic observation identi-
fies two kinds of important relationships: collabora-
tion and friendship. The analysis of networks of col-
laboration and friendship between the principal insti-
tutional entrepreneurs in this market in 2005 shows 
that, at its construction stage observed by Penal-
va-Icher, the market relies on a balance between heavy 
economic cooperation and heavy social competition. 
Even if there are no entry barriers in this market, so-
cial and informal barriers do exist to becoming a cen-
tral actor, a true institutional entrepreneur (Penal-
va-Icher 2008). These social barriers also separate ac-
tors with different notions of “social responsibility,” 
thus linking structure and the idea actors hold of their 
product’s quality. If access to the market is free, regu-
latory activity is “costly” in the sense that, in order to 
become an important actor in the process, it is neces-
sary to develop personal relational work. At this stage 
friendship is used by actors as a utilitarian tie exclud-
ing many players from the regulatory process, thus al-
lowing for a form of balance between collaboration for 
the collective construction of the market itself and so-
cial competition preserving self-interests. Because of 
the specific kind of relational infrastructures charac-
terizing this milieu, certain actors have the means to 
become successful entrepreneurs in the social con-
struction of their market in more than one way: they 
have different economic, relational, and symbolic re-
sources at their disposal, allowing them to influence 
regulation. Thus, after having emerged from action 
carried out by agencies of extra-financial rating push-
ing for technical norms, the market and its rules are 
redefined by financiers who impose their own view of 
SRI and take control of the market through complex 
strategies of cooptation.
Social networks are also central in peers’ use of 
their status to promote and institutionalize new norms 
at the transnational level. Their collective work is often 
collegial by construction (members of a parliament, 
for example, are all formally equal). For example, we 
find the same reliance on status inconsistency and 
rhetoric of sacrifice in transnational settings. A study 
of combined relational and cultural approaches to 
transnational institution-building –that of the Euro-
pean Unified Patent Court (Lazega, Quintane and 
Casenaz, 2016) – focused on a network analysis of a 
small collegial oligarchy with this high status inconsis-
tency and this rhetoric of sacrifice for the collective 
good. The study of a field-configuring event – called a 
“conclave” by some of its members – namely the so-
called Venice Forum that was central in creating and 
mobilizing a network of European patent judges for 
the construction of this new kind of European institu-
tion, tracked normative alignments in this collegial 
hierarchy of judges and their management of diver-
gent interpretations of the contemporary European 
patent. Using personalized social networks among its 
members, this collegial oligarchy works on harmoniz-
ing European approaches to intellectual property by 
selecting its institutional leaders based on cultural and 
strategic calculations of the costs of alignments on 
these leaders’ normative choices and judicial interpre-
tations. Highlighting this underexamined articulation 
of relational structures and cultural framing in trans-
national institutionalization shows, for example, how 
Northern European forms of capitalism tend to domi-
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nate in this institutionalization process at the expense 
of other forms. It also helps us to reflect on the useful-
ness of analyses of small networks of powerful players 
in organizational societies, in which power and influ-
ence are highly concentrated, as already shown by 
Laumann and Knoke (1987).
Co-evolutions of social processes
Relational infrastructures and horizontal and vertical 
differentiations that constitute social niches and forms 
of social status facilitate cooperation between compet-
itors. It is important for economic sociologists to be 
able to identify them because these forms are the 
means by which entrepreneurs seek to structure the 
contexts of their interactions and social and economic 
exchanges when they are thrust into open competi-
tion. The list of social processes facilitating this collec-
tive action between competitors – which can be mod-
eled by network analysis – is indefinite (that is, there is 
no finite list of these processes) because there are no 
social processes without a relational dimension. With 
help from creative statisticians, the neo-structural ap-
proach is not limited to these four generic processes or 
mechanisms. Other relational and informal processes 
that characterize collective action between interde-
pendent entrepreneurs have been the object of 
neo-structural formalizations: integration; assimila-
tion; cooptation; balance of powers; evaluation of pro-
duction quality; extraction of surprising economic 
performances and exploitation; discrimination; and 
desolidarization. 
These processes remain separate only analyti-
cally. Together they contribute to make durable coop-
eration between competitors possible. They are linked 
in a dynamic way, for example by retroaction effects. 
The redefinition of rules can engender new solidari-
ties. Normative beliefs produced by the regulatory 
process influence, for example, choices of advisors and 
therefore learning. Controversies in part energize the 
evolution of structures that facilitate collective learn-
ing. They contribute to the endogenous formation of 
the constraints that actors can then consider legiti-
mate or not, and to which they submit more or less 
“voluntarily.” Research on the articulation between 
these processes is only beginning. Knowledge of the 
social discipline that they constitute together and that 
organizes the business world is necessary to reflect on 
issues of social control of business and markets.
The articulation of interdependent processes 
also has an effect on the structural forms reconstituted 
by the observer and endogenized by the actors. These 
effects are at the origin of the dynamics of relational 
structures: new rules can reconfigure a system of 
niches; exercise of social control can encourage the 
emergence of new forms of social status and modify 
principles of status consistency. In turn, the new pro-
cesses that result from these changes make possible 
new modes of coordination between interdependent 
competitors. In order to better understand what it 
means to be in business in this interpersonal, inter-or-
ganizational, and dynamic context, neo-structural 
economic sociology must develop methods combin-
ing the systematic study of longitudinal and multi
-level data on identities, trajectories (in the long term), 
exchange networks, and representations (or contro-
versies). 
Developing this approach to cooperation be-
tween competitors leads to a re-evaluation of the role 
and organization of the State in its relationship to mar-
kets and the business world. Th is neo-structural the-
ory off ers an approach to this kind of cooperation that 
is useful for the protection of public interests through 
social control of business because it is adapted to the 
latter’s complexity. Drawing from Weberian theories 
concerning the “organizations of regulation of the 
economy” (wirtschaft sregulierende Verbände), eco-
nomic sociology has, since its beginnings, been con-
cerned with the creation, functioning, and evolution 
of institutions controlling market operations (Swed-
berg 1998; Steiner 1999). Th e state and public author-
ities have traditionally provided such institutions, no-
tably allowing the business world to manage the risks 
and problems that competition and contractual activ-
ity raise. But business has also participated, from the 
beginning, in building these institutions, as well as in 
the legal infrastructure of its markets (Berman 1983; 
Swedberg 2003). Th rough their eff orts for cooperation 
between competitors, as previously outlined, entre-
preneurs have always sought to defi ne the context of 
their exchanges, their opportunity structure.
Today, these forms of cooperation between 
competitors confront public authorities with new 
problems of social control over markets and business. 
When individual and corporate actors are thrust into 
increasingly more open competition, cooperation also 
becomes, paradoxically, the “fourth factor” of produc-
tion. The examination of social discipline and cooper-
ation between competitors in the organizational and 
market society offers new insights into contemporary 
forms of protection of the general interest. What ex-
emptions should be granted by competition policies 
when competition is also a matter of delivering quality 
in public services? In case of financial crisis, which 
bank should be saved from bankruptcy with taxpay-
ers’ money? How should incentives for R&D be de-
signed in a given market area? Old questions can be 
reassessed using insights from neo-structural sociol-
ogy on systems of interdependencies, relational work 
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and social mechanisms facilitating cooperation among 
competitors.
Using network analyses in this way to model so-
cial mechanisms is a useful for understanding cooper-
ation between interdependent competitors. There is a 
chance that this approach to coordination between 
interdependent and competing entrepreneurs devel-
ops because it seems to be in the best interest of both 
business and public authorities: the former within the 
framework of strategy, but also in its efforts to “cap-
ture” regulatory institutions or participate in the defi-
nition of social and economic policies; the latter in 
order to carry out its role as a “regulator” in more so-
phisticated ways and in increasingly complex contexts. 
However, in this domain, as in many others, expertise 
is still rarely on the side of public authorities and the 
general interest.
Towards dynamic multi-level 
network approaches to markets 
and market institutions
Social processes are highly dependent on the tempo-
rality of collective actions. For example, Montes-Lihn 
(2017) observes that the temporality of individual de-
cisions is a key variable in understanding how rela-
tional infrastructures are endogenized by individuals 
in specific situations. He shows that, in order to make 
informed decisions, his wine producers rely, alterna-
tively, and depending on the temporality of the techni-
cal decisions that they need to make, either on mem-
bers of their social niche or on actors with much 
higher status. When they face an urgent, short-term 
decision, they tend to rely on individuals with high 
status (experienced pioneers, identified with centrality 
in multiplex networks). However, when they need to 
validate a non-urgent or ordinary decision they turn 
to peers of their social niche. 
Thus dynamic dimension is made even more 
complex by the multi-level dimensions of collective 
action. Study of the regulatory process, in particular, 
has shown that competition between public authori-
ties and private business to regulate markets and build 
market institutions intrinsically has multi-level and 
dynamic dimensions. Relational infrastructures are 
complex and also intrinsically multi-level. Institu-
tional entrepreneurs with high status inconsistency, 
for example, can try to endogenize the structure by 
working simultaneously at several levels to seek to 
modify a normative order, and hence a given opportu-
nity structure, to their advantage. A clear difference 
must be made, for example, between networks of indi-
vidual entrepreneurs and inter-organizational net-
works of businesses, although both levels must also be 
linked in systematic ways by observation of cross-level 
interactions. 
This insight about the multi-level dimension of 
markets and market institutions has been generalized. 
Economic sociology has established the interdepen-
dencies between economic and social structures using 
the notion of embeddedness of the former in the latter. 
However, research usually studies inter-organizational 
commercial networks and inter-individual informal 
networks separately. From a neo-structural perspec-
tive, economic activities and markets are influenced 
by both levels (Brailly, 2016). A deal between two 
companies, which is an inter-organizational tie, de-
pends on inter-individual relationships, and vice 
versa. Economic relationships such as deals between 
two organizations and informal relationships between 
their members are interdependent. To explore this 
dual dimension, a multi-level social networks frame-
work has been developed by Lazega et al. (2008). This 
approach is based on the study of multi-level networks 
observing two superposed and partially nested, inter-
dependent levels of agency, an inter-organizational 
system of action, and an inter-individual one. Suppos-
ing that these levels are nested does not imply that 
they evolve symmetrically and in sync. The coevolu-
tion of two levels is complex, dynamic, and can be 
partly disconnected if not asynchronous, raising the 
issue of the costs of synchronization (Lazega, 2015). 
Different levels may not evolve and change simultane-
ously. The structural organization of each level and at-
tributes or context explaining tie formation at each 
level can be different. Brailly et al. (2016) have argued 
that this is why a multi-level approach is an interesting 
point of departure for reframing the issue of embed-
dedness. The challenge is to understand how social 
systems at both levels co-evolve and how actors at 
both levels coordinate to generate the socio-economic 
structure of the market. What specific multi-level so-
cial processes construct and explain the structure of 
an economic milieu? As shown by recent work, this 
multi-level approach is crucial for understanding glo-
balized markets that require long-distance partner-
ships between companies, “global pipelines” as Bathelt 
and Schuldt (2008) and Bathelt and Glückler (2010) 
call them.
Building on this framework Brailly et al. (2016) 
and Favre et al. (2016) have studied network forma-
tion at each level of specific markets; that is, trade fairs 
for television programs in Eastern Europe and in Af-
rica. They show that inter-individual and inter-organi-
zational networks are partly interdependent but also 
that different processes emerge at each level. 
In the European trade fair sellers and buyers of 
TV programs (distributors and TV channels) meet 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Volume 19 · Number 3 · July 2018
46Neo-structural economic sociology beyond embeddedness by ORIO Network
once a year to discuss contracts, make deals, keep in-
formed about new fi lms, series and game shows, and 
observe market evolution. Brailly et al. (2016) study the 
informal exchange of information between trade-fair 
attendees and formal deal ties between their companies 
by examining network formation at each level. Th ey 
fi nd that these networks are heavily interdependent 
but that each level has its own specifi c processes. Th ey 
emphasize that the contexts of tie formation between 
two organizations and two individuals are diff erent in 
terms of temporality. In the case of the market for TV 
programs, ethnography suggests that tacit knowledge 
and private information are crucial for individuals to 
identify commercial opportunities. Th e best way is to 
attend many events during a short time period (“next 
time this year”). But in parallel, their organizations have 
to be reliable in participating over a long time period 
in successive events at the same place (“same time next 
year”). If deals are initiated by specifi c employees in 
an inter-organizational context, diff erent temporalities 
overlap and interact in the system: inter-individual re-
lationships change faster and inter-organizational rela-
tions change more slowly. Organizational relationships 
have a diff erent time frame than interpersonal links. 
Some organizations develop specifi c mechanisms to 
cope with this a-synchrony. Th is underlines that the 
effi  ciency of the meta-unity individual/organization is 
a complex articulation between these two sets of ac-
tors, forever on the razor’s edge. While each level has 
its own specifi c processes they are partly nested: levels 
of agency emerge in diff erent contexts and in diff erent 
temporalities. Multi-level temporalities should thus be 
considered in terms of understanding the complexity 
of economic performance in such multi-level settings: 
in spite of diff erent temporalities, actors at each level 
manage these diff erent temporalities and both levels 
co-evolve nevertheless.
Favre et al. (2016) study the process of integra-
tion of the African continent into the globalized TV 
program distribution markets by also focusing on 
trade fairs as multi-level settings. These settings bring 
together African TV channel directors and interna-
tional TV program distributors from all parts of the 
world in the same place. During the post-colonial pe-
riod, African TV channels used to acquire programs 
for free, but entering the global market led to new 
forms of acquisition of TV programs. Integrating the 
global market requires a learning process, away from 
former market practices, to adapt to this new context 
and define new ways of transferring copyrights in this 
region. In fact, only the African actors have to adapt to 
and learn the rules (formal and informal) of the inter-
national TV program distribution market (Favre and 
Brailly 2015a). This means, for example, joining social 
niches of international sellers that are based, for exam-
ple, on linguistic homophily (francophone, Latin 
American, anglophone). Multi-level network analyses 
of the African trade fairs reveal a market segmented 
into groups with divergent interests and “visions” of 
how this market should be regulated. In particular, 
they show that only two groups are able to influence 
the evolution of this market by controlling the trade 
fairs’ conferences. Favre et al. (2015) also give evidence 
of this adaptation as a synchronization process. Study-
ing informal discussion networks among individual 
sellers and buyers and business ties between their 
companies, they show that while “long-terms” rela-
tionships are highly influenced by inter-organizational 
structure, the ties created during the events are not. 
This difference shows that during this kind of event 
individuals can break free from the influence of in-
ter-organizational structure to create ties across bor-
ders, and show that the synchronization of levels could 
sometimes belong to the organization. However, only 
individuals well integrated in the market could do so. 
Understanding performance in a global market re-
quires dual positioning of individuals and organiza-
tions and understanding of how actors build their re-
lational infrastructures to control processes such as 
learning and regulation. This explains, in part, the 
spread and homogenization of audiovisual culture at 
the global level.
Conclusion
Thus, the emergence of cooperation in competitive 
economic environments depends on interdependent 
entrepreneurs’ capacity to build this social discipline 
and to (self-)impose it collectively. This requires rela-
tional infrastructures and the deployment of social 
processes that these relational infrastructures facili-
tate. We have illustrated these articulations with sev-
eral examples. Identifying such social niches and 
forms of status in various markets is an important step 
in neo-structural analyses of the economy. Both kinds 
of differentiations, horizontal and vertical, are mod-
eled using social network analyses combined with in-
formation about actors’ attributes and their organized 
collective action (division of work and authority/
power rapports). Searching for a social niche corre-
sponds to searching for multifunctional contexts in 
which these entrepreneurs can have access to resources 
at lower cost and protect their social relationships; sta-
tus competition allows, for example, for concentrating 
these resources in order to achieve a dominant posi-
tion in the definition of the terms of exchanges, in par-
ticular social exchanges.
This approach to cooperation between competi-
tors can be termed “neo-structural” because it com-
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bines culture, structure, and agency, originally extend-
ing White’s approach to markets to include, and bring 
to light, the social discipline (between interdependent 
entrepreneurs) and public–private economic order 
that is created by reliance on relational infrastructures 
and social processes. In particular, this social disci-
pline, which succeeds in making competitors (through 
price and/or quality) cooperate, can be measured and 
modeled thanks to the analysis of social and economic, 
intra- and inter-organizational, networks, combined 
with data on culture and agency. It shows that innova-
tions, in terms of production markets or market insti-
tutions, always emerge in multi-level settings: every 
innovation is both “networked” and controversial at 
all levels, separately and jointly.
This “go to” presentation provides a few leads 
and short illustrations for further exploration of the 
work and potential of neo-structural economic sociol-
ogy. For the past twenty years, this approach has been 
using the sociology and ethnography of work and or-
ganizations, combined with network analyses, to de-
velop a perspective on production markets and their 
joint regulation (by public authorities and private 
business). As shown by all these illustrations, there is a 
strong link between the ways in which cooperation 
among competitors works as a “fourth factor” of pro-
duction and the creation/reproduction of social in-
equalities in contemporary capitalist societies. 
Neo-structural economic sociology increases socio-
logical knowledge of how markets can be used as 
Selznickian organizational “tools with a life of their 
own” to increase inequalities. Whether in the restau-
rant industry, where multiplex relational life can be 
another source of inequality between restaurant own-
ers locked in or out of market segments; or in trade 
fairs, for example, where relational infrastructures are 
used disproportionately by sales representatives of the 
largest companies; evidence abounds that mechanisms 
of cooperation among competitors are often too costly 
for many actors in the market, above all for individu-
als working in/as smaller organizations at the lowest 
levels of social stratification. In addition to these at-
tribute-based inequalities, the capacity to act at sev-
eral levels simultaneously is another discriminant fac-
tor of inequality that helps to reinforce the power of 
the stronger companies by helping their employees to 
obtain contextualized, private and strategic client-re-
lated resources and to hoard opportunities (Tilly, 
1998) while desolidarizing smaller players and break-
ing down their capacity to cooperate. 
In a context in which people are not equal in 
their capacity to defend their regulatory interests, the 
more private actors can promote private cooperation 
among competitors to shape public institutions (La-
zega 2001, 2016; Lazega and Mounier, 2002; Lazega et 
al., 2016), the more neo-structural work adds value by 
collecting live data on structure (including network 
patterns), culture and agency independently, based on 
own academic surveys and fieldwork; in other words, 
not just relying on secondary datasets derived from 
sources that are conveniently – and often mislead-
ingly – made available one or two clicks away. Design-
ing one’s own surveys, collecting live academic datasets 
and carefully mixing methods will always permit a 
better understanding of actors, actions (including 
their meanings), infrastructures, and generic social 
processes, including combinations of State dirigism 
and/or laissez-faire in economic policies. This is espe-
cially the case when Big Tech private hegemons in-
creasingly do the same with unprecedented levels of 
intrusiveness in monitoring both the private and pub-
lic dimensions of these social realities. This is where 
neo-structural sociology more generally will always be 
pivotal in public research on the economy and on pol-
itics. This is how public social sciences can be critically 
relevant in the current era of momentous transitions.
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